ModSecurity rules for Tikiwiki 1.x tiki-graph_formula.php Function Injection Vulnerability

A new vulnerability has been found in Tikiwiki. Read more about it here.

I’ve created the following ModSecurity rule to block it.

SecDefaultAction “log,deny,phase:2,status:403,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase”

SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME “tiki-graph_formula.php” “chain,msg:’TIKIWIKI tiki-graph_formula.php link inclusion attempt’,severity:2″
SecRule ARGS:/^s*[a-z]+$/ “^(ht|f)tps?://”

SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME “tiki-graph_formula.php” “chain,msg:’TIKIWIKI tiki-graph_formula.php f parameter Function Injection Vulnerability’,severity:2″
SecRule ARGS_NAMES “^s*f[.*]$”

Ivan, I hope these rules survive your scrutiny ;-)

Updated at 13:50: The first rule only covered the file inclusion in the title parameter which was what I was seeing in my logs. These rules should cover both the inclusion and the injection.

ModSecurity rule for Tikiwiki XSS

I just read about a Tikiwiki XSS here. Since the Vuurmuur wiki runs Tikiwiki I created a ModSecurity rule for it:

SecDefaultAction “log,deny,phase:2,status:403,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase”

# XSS in remind password field
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD “^post$” “chain,msg:’TIKIWIKI lost password XSS'”
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME “tiki-remind_password.php” “chain”
SecRule ARGS:/s*username/ “!^(:?[a-z0-9-_]{1,37})$”

This allows only valid usernames to be entered.

Update: Ivan Ristic privately pointed me at some possible problems with the rule:

  1. the escaping of the – and _ chars is not needed, although it seems to be harmless.
  2. the $ at the end of the filename is dangerous, because Apache treats tiki-remind_password.php/xxx as tiki-remind_password.php. In this case the rule is evaded.
  3. PHP (which Tikiwiki uses) ignores leading spaces in request arguments. So it treats ‘ username’ the same as ‘username’. The rule needs to deal with that.

Thanks for your feedback Ivan!

Old rule:

SecDefaultAction “log,deny,phase:2,status:403,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase”

# XSS in remind password field
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD “^post$” “chain,msg:’TIKIWIKI lost password XSS’”
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME “tiki-remind_password.php$” “chain”
SecRule ARGS:username “!^(:?[a-z0-9-_]{1,37})$”

Using Modsec2sguil for HTTP transaction logging

Modsec2sguil is currently configured to send alerts to Sguil. ModSecurity can be configured to log any event or transaction, including 200 OK, 302 Redirect, etc. Modsec2sguil distinguishes between alerts and other events by only processing HTTP codes of 400 and higher. Since 0.8-dev2 there is a configuration directive to prevent certain codes, such as 404, from being treated as an alert.

Now I have the following idea. Since ModSecurity can log all events with details of request headers, response headers and POST message body, it may be interesting to just send all these events to Sguil. They should not be appearing as alerts, but having them in the database can perhaps be interesting. I know using flow data and full packet captures the same data can be accessed, but having it in the database makes querying it a lot easier and longer available.

Possible problems are mostly the performance hit the webserver may take for sending all these events to Sguil and the storage requirements in Sguil’s database. I estimate the events are about 1kb in size on average, so on a busy site this may cause the database to grow very rapidly. Of course this behavior would be optional so it can be disabled.

Any thoughts on this idea?

First Modsec2sguil release for Sguil 0.7-CVS

I just uploaded a new version of Modsec2sguil. I’ve been working on it the last weeks to get it updated to Sguil 0.7. The scripts are changed all over the place. This is because in the 0.7 framework, my scripts would no longer be a replacement for Barnyard only talking to the sensor_agent on the localhost, instead now it would become a full agent talking to the Sguil server directly.

This brings some challenges. First the connection can be going over the internet, or another untrusted network, so the agent needs ssl support. Second, since the connection may be unreliable we need to be able to detect and deal with lost connections. Next to this I wanted to be able to run without superuser privileges.

The new version of modsec2sguil supports it all, and more:

  • Converted into a real agent for Sguil 0.7 (no more barnyard replacement)
  • Agent can drop privileges
  • Agent can daemonize
  • Pinging the server is supported
  • The agent reconnects to the server if the connection is lost
  • Agent supports SSL for the connection to the server
  • A sguil-compatible configuration file is now used
  • A debug mode was added

So if you run Sguil 0.7-CVS and ModSecurity, go check it out at

Last but not least, the agent contains a Perl library. I hope it enables developers to easily create Perl agents for Sguil. If you need help with that, please let me know!

Sguil 0.7 CVS installation on Debian Etch

Sguil 0.7 is getting shape quite nicely. One of the most interesting new features is the splitting up of different types of agents and the option to create ‘net groups’. This are groups of agents that Sguil considers part of the same network. You can use this to spread the agents over multiple servers, but still use it from Sguil as if it was one single sensor. For example, this way you can easily create a Snort sensor and a separate full content logging capture server. When you request the full content for a Snort event in Sguil, it will know that it needs to request the packet data from the capture server. This way you can also have multiple Snort agents without the need for capturing the same sancp and full content data over and over again.

David Bianco has written a very nice guide for installing Sguil 0.7 on Redhat Enterprise 4. I used this guide to install the server and sensor on a Debian Etch installation. The main difference is that I used Debian packages where ever possible. These packages could be used:


Important: do not use the tcl8.4 package. It is not compatible with Sguil and will produce the following message:

ERROR: This version of tcl was compile with threading enabled. Sguil is NOT compatible with threading.
SGUILD: Exiting…

You can get Sguil 0.7 CVS by checking out the latest CVS version:

cvs login
cvs co sguil

I will update Modsec2sguil soon!

Running IPv6 with Freenet6 when on the road

I wrote about my experiments with IPv6 before. These were done for my home network where I have an ISP that offers an IPv6 tunnel broker. The last two months I have not been in my home, but instead using internet ‘on the road’ mostly through wireless LANs. There are a number of techniques for using IPv6 if your provider doesn’t offer it, and today I stumbled on one in this NetworkWorld article, so I decided to give it a try.

The artice is about a new IPv6 portal called, where you can find IPv6 related news and forums. Next to this access to a free IPv6 broker is offered: freenet6. Freenet6 works by tunneling the IPv6 packets in UDP packets over IPv4. Getting it is easy, register an account and download the software. When you are running Debian or Ubuntu you can even skip the last step, a mere ‘apt-get install freenet6′ will do it. This is what I did. Next I just had to enter the username and password I had entered in the registration process in a file called ‘/etc/tsp/tspc.conf’ and issue the command ‘tspc -f /etc/tsp/tspc.conf’. Opening and comfirmed I was using IPv6!

Since I’m behind NAT-router internet hosts can’t connect to my laptop directly, but with IPv6 this changes. My laptop is now using a public IPAdress, so I set up a simple firewall script using ip6tables. I found two sites enabling you to check how the internet sees you, here and here. Both showed that my firewall is working. Good.

So now I wanted to blog about this, so I tried to login to my blog… ‘Access Denied’. Oops! Forgot that I only allow certain IPv4 addresses to the admin interface of my blog. This was a good time to see how ModSecurity deals with IPv6 addresses in its rules:

SecRule REMOTE_ADDR “!(|2001:5c0:8fff:fffe::62fd)” “chain,phase:1,deny,redirect:”
SecRule REQUEST_URI “/wp-login.php$”

This rule blocks access to wp-login.php for everyone but and 2001:5c0:8fff:fffe::62fd, and redirects them to a static page called nologin.html. This works using IPv6 as well! As you can see ModSecurity does not only support IPv6, it even allows you to mix IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in rules! Now all that was left was the /wp-admin/ section that didn’t block in ModSecurity, but just with Apache itself:

<Location /blog/wp-admin>
Order deny,allow
Deny from all
Allow from
Allow from 2001:5c0:8fff:fffe::62fd

After an Apache restart I could write this post using IPv6!