Snort_inline 2.6 development update

Development of Snort_inline 2.6 experienced a bit of a setback when William and I discovered that the new Stream4inline had some issues with detecting certain attacks. Since we are scanning the reassembled stream certain detection plugins didn’t work as expected. Basically every detection plugin that uses absolute offsets from the packet start is messed up when we scan the reassembled stream only.

This is because the start of the reassembled stream doesn’t match with the start of the last packet added to this stream. Most TCP sigs are using offsets match against the start of the stream, or relative matches. For example a rule like:

alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS 80 (msg:”GET request”; content:”GET”; offset:0; depth:3; sid:12345678; rev:1);

matches against the start of the stream since ‘GET’ will be the first data on the stream. In this case the reassembled stream only scanning would have worked fine because the start of the reassembled stream would match the start of the stream. So offset:0 in the reassembled stream points to the stream start, which is what we want in this case.

Things get different however, when we try to match against midstream packets where the rule matches against the actual packet start. One might argue that this is a bad idea in most cases, and I agree. Since TCP moves data stream based and not packet based, hardly any assumptions can be done about packet sizes, etc. Most TCP rules don’t use this, so the problem is fairly limited. An example of a rule that does this is the eDonkey detection sigs in the Bleeding ruleset.

As a solution we came up with the following. We scan every packet individually and in it’s reassembled stream. This is certainly more expensive, but the only way to avoid the evasion problems. I think we can probably add an option to make this behaviour optional, so the admin can choose to be extra safe at the cost of some perfomance.