Suricata 1.0.2 released

After some well deserved vacation I’m getting back up to speed in Suricata development. Luckily most of our dev team continued to work in my absence, making today’s 1.0.2 release possible.

The main focus of this release was fixing the TCP stream engine. Judy Novak found a number of ways to evade detection. See her blog post describing the issues.

The biggest other change is the addition of a new application layer module. The SSH parser parses SSH sessions and stops detection/inspection of the stream after the encrypted part of the session has started. So this is mainly a module focused on reducing the number of packets that need inspection, just like the SSL and TLS modules.

As a bonus though, we introduced two rule keywords that match on the parsed SSH parameters:

ssh.protoversion will match against the ssh protocol version. I’ll give some examples.


This will match on 2.0 exactly.


This will match on 2, but also 1.99 and other versions compatible to “2”.


The last example will match on all versions starting with “1.”, so 1.6, 1.7, etc.

ssh.softwareversion will match on the software version identifier. An example:


This will match only on session using the PuTTY SSH client.

Other changes include better HTTP accuracy, better IPS functionality.

For the next release we will focus on further improving overall detection accuracy, improving inline mode further, improving performance and specifically improving CUDA performance. As always, we welcome any feedback. Or if you are interested in helping out, please contact us!

Update: added a link to Judy Novak’s blog post on the TCP evasions.

ModSecurity evasion vulnerability

ModSecurity author Ivan Ristic just reported that a ModSecurity evasion vulnerability has been published without him being notified in advance, so there is no update available yet. Check here for his announcement. And here for the advisory. Ivan Ristic suggests everyone to use this workaround until an updated version of ModSecurity is released (put on a single line):

SecRule REQUEST_BODY “@validateByteRange 1-255” “log,deny,phase:2,t:none,msg:’ModSecurity ASCIIZ Evasion Attempt'”

I’ve been using that rule for an hour or so, and have seen no false positives so far.